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Workers and firms may bargain over general, multidimensional contracts; they 
may negotiate over health benefits, housing, retirement plans, etc. Substitutes, on 
the other hand, is the assumption commonly placed on firms’ preferences to guaran-
tee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. In this paper I show that, 
when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be embed-
ded into a model of bargaining over wages.
The economics of the embedding is straightforward, except for a small twist. When 
a firm and a worker negotiate over a contract, they may bargain over many dimensions. 
However, the Pareto frontier of contracts is, in a sense, “one dimensional”: what is bet-
ter for the worker is worse for the firm. So Pareto optimal contracts may be viewed as 
salaries, with the better contracts for the firm meaning lower salaries, and the better 
contracts for the worker meaning higher salaries. The twist is that a firm’s ranking over 
contracts might be affected by the firm’s other hires. For example, health plan A may 
be better than B for a firm if it has many employees, but B beats A if it has few. When 
contracts are substitutes, it turns out that the ranking is not affected in this way.
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a model of two-sided worker-firm match-
ing with contracts. A firm will hire a collection of workers and will negotiate 
a contract with each one of them. The model is a generalization of Kelso and 
Crawford (1982), where each firm and each worker negotiate a wage.1 Kelso 
and Crawford show that, when firms’ demands satisfy gross substitutes, the core of 
the matching market is nonempty. Hatfield and Milgrom show that, when the firms’ 
preferences over contracts satisfy their notion of substitutes, the core of the market 
is nonempty.
I show that Hatfield and Milgrom’s model can be embedded into the model of 
Kelso and Crawford. Hatfield and Milgrom’s assumption of substitutability enables 
an embedding where firms’ demands for workers satisfy Kelso and Crawford’s 
notion of gross substitutes. As a result, the nonemptiness of the core follows from 
the argument in Kelso and Crawford, and their salary adjustment algorithm finds a 
stable matching of workers to firms, and a vector of supporting salaries.
Hatfield and Milgrom’s paper is an elegant analysis of two-sided matching. It sim-
plifies matching models and makes their relationship to auction models more transpar-
ent. Their paper contributes much more than showing the nonemptiness of the core 
when firms and workers can sign general contracts, and my result does not  diminish 
1 Kelso and Crawford build on the analysis of Crawford and Knoer (1981); see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for 
a description of the models.
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their contribution in the least. I believe, however, that there is value in clarifying the 
relationship between contracts and salaries. One step in that direction is taken by 
Hatfield and Kojima (2010), who investigate conditions on preferences over contracts 
that are weaker than substitutes and still generate stable matchings. My embedding 
does not work under Hatfield and Kojima’s weaker conditions (see Section IIC below).
Future research should explain the consequences of the added generality of con-
tracts over salaries in different economic environments. A paper that seeks to extend 
some classical result on matching to matching with contracts would need to sort out 
to what extent allowing for contracts provides a more general result. It may be that 
contracts are not more general, which would not by itself invalidate the exercise but 
would be an important feature to understand.
I. Embedding
A. Definitions
I shall describe two models. The model of a matching market with contracts 
with substitutable choices is due to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). The model of a 
matching market with salaries and gross substitutes in demand is due to Kelso and 
Crawford (1982).
contracts.—A matching market with contracts is described by:
•	 (finite, disjoint) sets W of workers, F of firms, and X of contracts; each contract 
x ∈ X is assigned one worker  x W ∈ W and one firm  x F ∈ F;
•	 for	each	worker	w ∈ W, a utility function  u w : X ∪ {~} → ℜ ; and for each firm 
f ∈ F, a utility function  u f :  2 X → ℜ; all utility functions are one-to-one (prefer-
ences are strict).
A firm f ’s utility function determines a choice rule  c f : for A ⊂ X,  c f (A) is the 
maximal subset of A according to  u f . Note that since  u f is one-to-one,  c f (A) is 
uniquely defined. The empty set ~ represents for f the option of hiring no workers. 
For notational convenience, I have not restricted the domain of  u f to contracts with 
f =  x F , but of course we want f to sign contracts only in its own name; assume then 
that x ∈  c f (A) implies f =  x F . Assume also that x, x′ ∈  c f (A) implies  x W ≠  x W ′ .
For a worker w, ~ represents an outside option: a contract that is always avail-
able to her if she chooses to reject the contract some firm offers her. Suppose that if 
x W ≠ w then  u w (x) <  u w (~).
A set of contracts A is feasible if, for all workers w, there is at most one x ∈ A 
with w =  x W .
A firm f ’s utility satisfies substitutability if, for any set of contracts A, and any two 
contracts x and x′, x ∉  c f (A ∪ {x}) implies x ∉  c f (A ∪ {x, x′ }).
The tuple (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) describes a matching market with contracts.
A set of contracts A ⊂ X is individually rational if, for all x ∈ A,  u  x W  (x) ≥  u  x W  (~); 
and for all firms f,  c f (A) = {x ∈ A : f =  x F }.
A set of contracts A ⊂ X is stable if it is individually rational and if for any firm f 
and set of contracts A′ ≠ A with A′ =  c f (A ∪ A′ ), there is one contract x′ ∈ A′ such 
that either  u  x W ′  (x′ ) <  u  x W ′  (~) or there is x ∈ A with  x W = x ′ W and  u  x W ′  (x′ ) <  u  x W ′  (x).
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salaries.—A matching market with salaries is described by:
•	 (finite, disjoint) sets W of workers, F of firms, and s ⊂  ℜ + of salaries;
•	 for	each	worker	w ∈ W, a utility function  v w : F ∪ {~} × s → ℜ ; and for each 
firm f ∈ F, a utility function  v f :  ∪ A⊂W A × s → ℜ; all utility functions are one-
to-one (preferences are strict).
We can suppose that s is the set {0, 1, … l} of the first l + 1 nonnegative integers, 
for some l.
For a firm f,  v f defines a demand function  D f :  s W →  2 W by
  D f (s) = arg ma x A⊂W v f ({(w,  s w ) : w ∈ A}).
I restrict attention to demand functions, not correspondences, by virtue of Hatfield 
and Milgrom’s assumption of strict preferences. Say that D satisfies gross substi-
tutes if, for any two vectors of salaries, s and s′, if s ≤ s′ and  s w =  s w ′ then w ∈ D(s) 
implies that w ∈ D(s′ ).
A matching is a function μ : W → F ∪ {~} × s. A matching assigns to each 
worker a firm and a salary; I use the μ(w) = (~, 0) notation for when w is unmatched 
(unemployed). A matching specifies for each firm f a collection of workers with 
their corresponding salaries:  μ 0 ( f ) = {(w, s) : ( f, s) = μ(w)}. The set  μ 0 ( f ) is thus 
the set of workers employed by f, and their salaries, in the matching μ.
The tuple (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )) describes a matching market with salaries.
A matching μ is individually rational if, for every f and w,  v f ( μ 0 ( f )) ≥  v f (B) for 
all B ⊂  μ 0 ( f ) and  v w (μ(w)) ≥  v w (~, 0).
A matching μ is stable if it is individually rational and if, for any firm f and 
A ⊂ W, if there is a vector of salaries ( s w ) w∈A with  v f ({(w,  s w ) : w ∈ A}) >  v f ( μ 0 ( f )) 
then there is w ∈ A with  v w (μ(w)) >  v w ( f,  s w ).
B. Embedding
Let (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) be a matching market with contracts, and (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )) a matching market with salaries. An embedding of (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) into (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )) is a one-to-one function g which maps each x ∈ X into a triple ( x F ,  x W , s) ∈ F × W × s.
Let g be such an embedding, and A ⊂ X. Say that g(A) defines a matching if for 
any w there is at most one s and f with ( f, w, s) ∈ g(A). The matching defined by 
A under g is the function μ : W → F × s defined by μ(w) = ( f, s) if  g −1 ( f, w, s) ∈ A 
and μ(w) = (~, 0) otherwise.
THEOREM 1: let (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) be a matching market with contracts. if 
firms’ choices satisfy substitutability, then there is a matching market with salaries (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )), and an embedding g of (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) into (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )) 
such that
 1) firms’ demand functions in (F, W, s, ( v f ), ( v w )) satisfy gross substitutes;
 2) A ⊂ X is a set of stable contracts if and only if g(A) defines a stable matching.
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The proof of Theorem 1 works by constructing an embedding. As suggested in 
the introduction, the Pareto frontier of contracts is “one dimensional”: what is better 
for the worker is worse for the firm. So Pareto optimal contracts may be translated 
into salaries, with the better contracts for the firm defining lower salaries, and the 
better contracts for the worker defining higher salaries. The problem is that a firm’s 
ranking over contracts might be affected by the firm’s other hires. For example, con-
sider contracts x and x′, both involving worker w and firm f. Suppose that x is bet-
ter than x′ for f, and x′ is better than x for w; so we would map x into a lower salary 
than x′. In the absence of substitutes, this mapping might be affected by the presence of 
other contracts. However, since x′ is rejected by f when x is available, substitutes make 
sure that it will continue to be rejected when other workers and contracts are available. 
So the assumption of substitutes allows for the pairwise mapping of contracts into 
salaries to work globally, when all workers and firms are considered. The construction 
uses the salaries 1, 2, 3, …; but any other grid works in exactly the same way.
PROOF:
Say that a contract x is dominated for  x F and  x W if there is a contract x′ with  x F =  x F ′ ,  x W =  x W ′ ,  u  x F  (x′ ) >  u  x F  (x) and  u  x W  (x′ ) >  u  x W  (x). Let  X fw be the set of all con-
tracts x with  x F = f and  x W = w that are not dominated for f and w. Note that  X fw can 
be ordered by  u w ; that is, I can enumerate the elements of  X fw as  x 1 , … ,  x ∥  X fw ∥ with 
u w ( x i ) <  u w ( x i+1 ). Then I can write  X fw = {(w, s) : s = 1, … , ∥  X fw ∥} with the under-
standing that (w, s) corresponds to offering worker w the contract  x s in  X fw . Note that 
s < s′ if and only if  u f ({w, s}) >  u f ({w, s′ }): by definition, if s < s′ then  u w ( f, s) < 
u w ( f, s′ ) so  u f ({w, s}) <  u f {w, s′ } would imply that (w, s) is dominated.
Let K = max{∥  X fw ∥ : f ∈ F, w ∈ W } and s = {1, 2, … , K + 1}. For convenience, 
let’s augment the contracts in  X fw to include (w, s) with ∥  X fw ∥ < s ≤ K + 1. Assume 
that if s > ∥  X fw ∥ then, for all A, (w, s) ∉  c f (A). The embedding g is the mapping 
that takes x ∈ X into ( f, w, s) with (w, s) being the representation of x in  X fw if x is not 
dominated, and into ( x F ,  x F , K + 1) if it is.2
Define firms’ and workers’ utilities as follows. Let  v w ( f, s) =  u w (x), where x ∈  X fw 
corresponds to s. Let  v f (( w 1 ,  s 1 ), … , ( w n ,  s n )) =  u f (( w 1 ,  s 1 ), … , ( w n ,  s n )). For a vec-
tor of wages s = ( s w ) w∈W ∈  s W , let  X f s ⊂  X f be the set of contracts (w,  s w ). Define a 
demand function  D f for firm f by  D f (s) =  c f ( X f s) (this is consistent with our defini-
tion of utility for f ).
I shall now prove that  D f satisfies the GS property. Let  X f s+ = {(w, s) ∈ W × s : 
s ≥  s w }, where  s w denotes w’s salary in s. I first prove that  c f ( X f s) =  c f ( X f s+ ). If 
X f 
s+ =  X f s then there is nothing to prove. Let (w, s) ∈  X f s+ \ X f s . There must exist some 
s′, with s′ < s and (w, s′ ) ∈  X f s+ . Note that s′ < s implies (w, s) ∉  c f ({(w, s), (w, s′ )}) 
because  u f (w, s) <  u f (w, s′ ) and  c f ({(w, s), (w, s′ )}) cannot contain two contracts 
with the same worker. So {(w, s), (w, s′ )} ⊂  X f s+ implies, by the property of substitut-
ability, that (w, s) ∉  c f ( X f s+ ). Thus I have shown that  c f ( X f s+ ) ⊂  c f ( X f s). Since  X f s ⊂ 
X f 
s+ , the definition of  c f implies that  c f ( X f s+ ) =  c f ( X f s).
Now, let s = ( s w ) and s′ = ( s w ′ ) be vectors with s ≤ s′ while for  w 0 ∈ W, 
s  w 0  =  s  w 0  ′ , and  w 0 ∈  D f (s). Suppose by way of contradiction that  w 0 ∉  D f (s′ ). Then 
2 Strictly speaking, for dominated x we would need to set g(x) = ( x F ,  x F , K + l), choosing l ≥ 1 so that g remains 
one-to-one.
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( w 0 ,  s  w 0  ′ ) ∉  c f ( X f s′ ) =  c f ( X f  s ′ + ). But then  X f  s ′  + ⊂  X f s+ so substitutability implies 
that ( w 0 ,  s  w 0  ′ ) ∉  c f ( X f s+ ). Now,  c f ( X f s+ ) =  c f ( X f s) and ( w 0 ,  s  w 0  ) = ( w 0 ,  s  w 0  ′ ) implies 
that ( w 0 ,  s  w 0  ) ∉  c f ( X f s), a contradiction.
The proof that A is stable in (F, W, X, ( u f ), ( u w )) if and only if g(A) is stable in (F, W, s,( v f ), ( v w )) is straightforward.
II. Discussion
A. Antecedents
The identification of contracts and salaries is not new. Both Crawford and Knoer 
(1981), and Kelso and Crawford (1982), mention how salaries can be interpreted 
as contracts. Roth (1984), who presents an early model of matching with contracts, 
also identifies contracts with salaries. The new observation here is that substitutabil-
ity is important for the identification of contracts and salaries. It is not mentioned in 
the literature that follows Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).3
B. quasilinearity
In Kelso and Crawford, firms’ profits are quasilinear, but their existence proof is 
more general and does not depend on quasilinearity. One detail is that they require 
a salary that is high enough so no worker would be hired at that salary (see their 
Lemma 2). In the embedding in the theorem, we do have such a salary.
C. Bilateral substitutes
In a model of matching with contracts, Hatfield and Kojima (2010) present a 
generalization of substitutes, called bilateral substitutes. They show stable match-
ing with contracts exists under bilateral substitutes. Here I show that the model of 
Hatfield-Kojima cannot be embedded into the Kelso-Crawford model.
The following example is from Hatfield and Kojima (2010). Let the set of firms be 
{ f, f ′ }, the set of workers {w, w′ }, and the set of contracts be {x,  ˜  x, z,  ˜  z, z′ }. Let x and  ˜  x
involve firm f and worker w, while z and  ˜  z involve worker w′ and firm f. Contract z′ 
is between w′ and f ′. Suppose that agents’ utilities are such that their preferences are:
 ≽ f  ≽  f  ′   ≽ w  ≽  w ′  
{x, z} {z′ }  ˜  x z
{ ˜  z } ~ x z′
{ ˜  x } ~  ˜  z
{x} ~
{z}
~.  
3 Recently, my result has been extended by Scott Kominers to the many-to-many matching model (see Kominers 
forthcoming).
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I have omitted the alternatives that are worse than ~. Suppose that there is an 
embedding, where x maps to the salary  s x and  ˜  x to the salary  s  ˜  x . Then x ∉  c f ({x, ˜  x}) 
means that  s x >  s  ˜  x . This would imply that
  u f ( x W ,  z W ,  s x ,  s z ) <  u f ( ˜  xW ,  z W ,  s  ˜  x ,  s z ),
as  x W =  ˜  xW , which is incompatible with the preferences above.
I should clarify that a deviation from substitutes does not by itself prevent the 
model with contracts from being embeddable into a model with salaries. The struc-
ture of bilateral substitutes is interesting because it is a deviation from substitutes for 
which existence is guaranteed.
D. Algorithm
Under the embedding, the algorithm proposed by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) 
is equivalent to the algorithm proposed by Kelso and Crawford (1982). It is easy 
to see that they are equivalent because the two algorithms find the same matching: 
the firm-optimal or the worker-optimal matching, depending on how the algorithms 
are formulated.
Here, I want to show that the algorithms not only calculate the same matchings, 
but that they also work in essentially the same way: the algorithms take equiva-
lent routes to a stable matching. The Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm starts by each 
firm f “offering’’ the best contracts for f, and the workers sequentially rejecting 
offers. In the embedding, the best contracts correspond to the lowest salaries; 
and, in a similar vein, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm starts at the lowest sala-
ries. In Hatfield-Milgrom, when a contract gets rejected, it is as if the salary for 
that worker is raised. Similarly, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm works by raising 
the salaries of workers who reject an offer. Broadly speaking, the steps taken by 
the Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm represent movements along the Pareto frontier 
of contracts—movements in a direction that corresponds to higher salaries in the 
Kelso-Crawford model.
The following example illustrates the point and, I hope, helps in understanding the 
nature of the embedding better.
Suppose there are two firms and two workers: F = {  f 1 ,   f 2 } and W = { w 1 ,  w 2 }. Let 
X = { x 1 ,  x 3 ,  x 2 ,  y 1 ,  y 2 } be the set of contracts.
The agents’ preferences are:
 ≽  f 1   ≽  f 2   ≽  w 1   ≽  w 2  
{ x 1 } { y 2 }  x 3  y 1 { x 2 } { x 3 }  x 2 ~{ y 1 } ~  x 1 
~ ~.
The Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm takes the steps in the following table. I am using 
the same notation as Hatfield-Milgrom:  R W and  R F are the rejected contracts of, 
respectively, workers and firms.
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 X W  R W ( X W )  X F  R F ( X F )
0) ~ ~ X { x 2 ,  y 1 ,  x 3 }
1) { x 1 ,  y 2 } {  y 2 } X { x 2 ,  y 1 ,  x 3 }
2) { x 1 ,  y 2 } {  y 2 } { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  x 3 ,  y 1 } { x 2 ,  y 1 }
3) { x 1 ,  y 2 ,  x 3 } { x 1 ,  y 2 } { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  x 3 ,  y 1 } { x 2 ,  y 1 }
4) { x 1 , y 2 ,  x 3 } { x 1 ,  y 2 } { x 2 ,  x 3 ,  y 1 } {  y 1 }
5) { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  x 3 ,  y 2 } { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  y 2 } { x 2 ,  x 3 ,  y 1 } {  y 1 }
6) { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  x 3 ,  y 2 } { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  y 2 } { x 3 ,  y 1 } ~
7) X { x 1 ,  x 2 ,  y 2 } { x 3 ,  y 1 } ~
I shall interpret the iterations so as to simplify the comparison with Kelso-
Crawford. In (0) firms “offer’’ contracts  x 1 and  y 2 (they reject contracts { x 2 ,  y 1 ,  x 3 }. In 
1) the workers respond by  w 1 temporarily accepting  x 1 , while  w 2 rejects  y 2 . In 2) the 
firms offer  x 1 and  x 3 . In 3)  w 1 accepts  x 3 and rejects  x 2 . In 4)  f 1 offers  x 2 and  f 2 offers 
x 3 . 5)  w 1 rejects  x 2 . 6)  f 1 offers  y 1 and  f 2 offers  x 3 . 7) the workers accept  y 1 and  x 3 .
We can embed this market with contracts into a market with salaries. Let the set 
of salaries be {1, 2}. The relevant part of the agents’ preferences are:
  f 1  :  ( w 1 , 1) ≻ ( w 1 , 2) ≻ ( w 2 , 1)
  f 2  : ( w 2 , 1) ≻ ( w 1 , 1)
  w 1 : (  f 2 , 1) ≻ (  f 1 , 2) ≻ ( f 1 , 1)
  w 2 : (  f 1 , 1)
So, firm  f 1 prefers to hire  w 1 at a lower rather than a higher salary, and prefers to 
hire  w 1 at either salary over hiring  w 2 at a salary of 1. I omit, for example, that for 
w 1 (  f 2 , 2) ≻ (  f 2 , 1) because firm  f 2 is unwilling to hire  w 1 at a salary of 2 (she prefers 
to leave the position vacant).
Kelso and Crawford’s algorithm does:
 w 1  w 2 
0)  (  f 1 , 1) _ (  f 2 , 1)
1) (  f 1 , 1) (  f 2 , 1) _
2) (  f 1 , 2) (  f 2 , 1) _
3)  (  f 2 , 1) _  (  f 1 , 1) _ .
The meaning of the iterations is the following. The algorithm starts with all sala-
ries being 1. At this vector of salaries,  f 1 demands worker  w 1 while  f 2 demands worker 
w 2 . Worker  w 2 rejects the offer of firm 2 while  w 1 accepts the offer from  f 1 ; this is 
indicated by underlining the offer in the table. Since  f 2 ’s offer to  w 2 was rejected, 
the salary for that pair increases to 2. At that salary,  f 2 decides not to offer to  w 2 and 
instead demand  w 1 at a salary of 1. The rest of the iterations should be intuitive. In 
any case, the steps are essentially those of the Hatfield-Milgrom algorithm, where 
workers’ responses are included within each step in the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, 
and as a separate step in Hatfield-Milgrom. A general equivalence result is possible 
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but requires writing down an algorithm that interprets the steps of one algorithm in 
terms of the other.
E. law of Demand
In a matching model with contracts, a firm f satisfies the law of aggregate demand 
if A ⊆ A′ implies ∥  c f (A)∥ ≤ ∥  c f (A′ )∥. In a matching model with salaries, a firm 
f satisfies the law of aggregate demand if s ≥ s′ implies that ∥  D f (s′ )∥ ≥ ∥  D f (s)∥.
Using the embedding of Theorem 1, it is easy to show that if a firm satisfies the 
law of aggregate demand in the matching model with contracts, then it satisfies 
the law of aggregate demand in the embedded matching model with salaries.
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